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Making Friends of Foes: Bringing
Labor and Management Together
Through Integrative Bargaining
I. INTRODUCTION
Collective bargaining's unique history and structure make it an ideal setting
for integrative bargaining ("LB").1 First, most collective bargaining agreements
have a set expiration date,2 which causes the parties to constantly return to the
bargaining table to negotiate new terms. Second, collective bargaining in the
labor-management setting has a long history in the United States, and unions and
management tend to form long-lasting relationships.3 Finally, collective bargain-
ing agreements address complex interests and are designed to meet the needs of a
variety of constituents. These factors combine to produce a relationship involving
several individuals, going back multiple generations, who are sure to negotiate
with each other in the future. This differs from a distant negotiating relationship,
such as the sale of a car, where the parties' interactions are not likely to be ongo-
ing. "Overall, collective bargaining negotiations are often situated amid a long
acrimonious history between labor and management, and involve multiple consti-
tuents who represent a wide range of interests."
4
Because of this long-standing relationship and the likelihood that it will con-
tinue indefinitely, "an integrative approach to bargaining will be more appropriate
than the purely self-interested stance of the distributive bargainer."5 Collective
bargaining is truly "a process of accommodation between two institutions-the
managerial organization and the union organization-which have both common
and conflicting interests."6 IB seeks to unearth these interests, develop the com-
mon ground between the two institutions, and use those interests to maximize the
value of the collective bargaining agreement.
1. Generally speaking, collective bargaining is colloquially known as the process used by unions
and company officials to negotiate a contract or agreement encompassing issues such as pay, benefits
and grievance procedures. 1B, though less well-known, is an approach to negotiation that focuses on
collaboration and problem-solving, rather than confrontational negotiation. This process is defined in-
depth in Section Il.
2. Collective bargaining agreements under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63,
181-88 (2006), are the exception to this general rule. "Contracts under the RLA do not have fixed
expiration dates; rather, they are amendable dates, and remain in effect until a new agreement is
reached." Charles J. Hunt, Jr., Mediator Tactics: Strategies and Behaviors Utilized in Labor-
Management Negotiations, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 263, 268 (2007).
3. Hunt, Jr., supra note 2, at 266."The nature of labor-management relations is such that the parties
can deal with each other for years, or even decades." Id.
4. Nils 0. Fonstad et al., Interest-Based Negotiations in a Transformed Labor-Management Setting,
20 NEGOTIATION J. 5, 9 (2004). "[Tlhe continuous nature of labor relations produces strong links that
carry over and ingrain attitudes and trust levels from prior negotiations, and day-to-day interactions
that occur between rounds of formal talks." Id.
5. MELISSA L. NELKEN, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION 121, 124 (Anderson Pub. Co. 2001).
6. FREDERICK H. HARBISON & JOHN R. COLEMAN, GOALS AND STRATEGY IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 118 (Harper & Brothers 1951).
1
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1I. WHAT IS INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING AND How DOES IT DIFFER
FROM ADVERSARIAL BARGAINING?
There are two basic approaches to negotiation: the traditional adversarial
model and the newer tactic, IB.7 The adversarial model views negotiations as a
"zero-sum game in which anything won by one side is a loss by the other." 8 In the
collective bargaining context, what the union gains, the management loses. ' This
approach is also known as "positional bargaining," because parties in adversarial
negotiations advocate for positions; once those positions are declared, they find it
difficult to retreat. Positional bargaining resembles a power struggle with each
side declaring and asserting their positions without collaborating and cooperating
to reach a mutually agreed upon point.'0 The difficulty with this type of negotiat-
ing style is that it leads to heated exchanges, which distract the parties from reach-
ing a mutually advantageous solution."
Rather than fight over positions, the goal of LB is "to create solutions that sa-
tisfy needs of the parties."' 2 Whereas adversarial bargaining creates a situation
where one side's loss is another's gain, IB is used to create a win-win situation. 13
A key difference between the two approaches is that 1B promotes disclosure of
information and interests to maximize the advantages achieved through coopera-
tion between the parties. 14 Also, the adversarial approach is linear, meaning the
negotiation moves back and forth, as though tied to a line; one party makes an
offer, and the opposing party makes a counter-offer. In adversarial bargaining, the
negotiation never broadens to bring in outside parties or perspectives. IB, howev-
er, is more of a creative process which "requires an imaginative search for solu-
tions guided by a process based on negotiation theory."' 15 Rather than move back
and forth from offer to counter-offer, 1B involves the parties working together
simultaneously.
7. Hunt, Jr., supra note 2, at 270. IB goes by a variety of titles and has been referred to as prin-
cipled, integrative or problem-solving negotiation. NELKEN, supra note 5, at 121-22. "The problem-
solving approach has also been called 'integrative,' because it integrates the complementary interests
of the negotiating parties in order to create new value. It has been called 'principled,' because it seeks
solutions based on principle rather than on positions staked out by the parties." Alex J. Hurder, The
Lawyer's Dilemma: To Be or not To Be a Problem-Solving Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REv. 253, 255
(2007). Though some argue that there are slight differences between these styles, for purposes of this
discussion, the author will use them interchangeably to refer to a cooperative approach focused on
uncovering interests in a negotiation.
8. Hurder, supra note 7, at 255.
9. Hunt, Jr., supra note 2, at 270.
10. Id. at 270.
11. Id.
12. Hurder, supra note 7, at 273. Principled negotiation is similar to 113 in that both methods focus
on the underlying interests of the parties. However, principled negotiation follows a different process
focusing on deciding "issues on their merits rather than through a haggling process focused on what
each side says it will and won't do." ROGER FISHER Er AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHouT GIVING IN, xviii (Bruce Patton ed., Houghton Mifflin Co., 2d ed. 1991).
13. Hunt, Jr., supra note 2, at 270 (emphasis added). LB "bases the search for solutions on the needs,
interests, and values of the client and other parties to the negotiation, and thus the scope of the negotia-
tion might expand .. " Hurder, supra note 7, at 266.




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss1/8
Making Friends of Foes
Traditionally, labor-management negotiations have been conducted using the
adversarial method. 16 Labor-management negotiations generally involve a union
representative making an initial offer, followed by management's counter-offer.
The parties continue in this manner until an agreement has been reached in the
form of the collective bargaining agreement. Additionally, the parties use power,
rather than creative solutions, to reach a desired solution. 17 This exercise of power
can be seen in management's use of lock-outs and labor's use of strikes to encour-
age the other side to bargain.
While there is a history and tradition of adversarial negotiations in the labor-
management context, this is not to say that interested parties in the labor work-
force could not incorporate elements of IB into their negotiation process. Both
labor and management share common interests; therefore, IB can be well-suited to
the labor-management negotiation process.
III. INTERESTS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS
A. Using IB to Discover Parties' Goals, and Thereby Unearth
Their Underlying Interests
1B involves understanding each party's interests and focusing on solutions
that maximize those interests. In order for IB to be successful, the parties must
first know and understand what interests they bring to the bargaining table. In the
context of a collective bargaining agreement, LB can help the parties realize which
concerns led to their dispute and help them prioritize the issues. 18
In developing a list of interests they wish to explore, parties should remember
that these interests are the motivations behind their goals, not simply a restatement
of those goals. 19 A goal is an end result; in labor-management relations, a labor
goal could be to provide more vacation days for employees under the collective
bargaining agreement. Their interests underlying this goal may be to make their
union and workplace more attractive to prospective employees, to attract more
potential union members, or simply to meet a demand of their constituents. Look-
ing into the interests underlying goals-a hallmark of IB--can run counter to the
norm in traditional labor-management negotiations where the union's request is
really just a wish-list created at a union meeting, as opposed to a thoughtful col-
lection of interests that recognize the needs and desires of the union members.
20
16. Hunt, Jr., supra note 2, at 271.
17. Hurder, supra note 7, at 262.
18. Sylvia Skratek, Conflictive Partnerships Under Collective Bargaining: A Neutral's Perspective,
in WORKPLACE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION: DIREcTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 57, 61 (Sandra
E. Gleason ed., Mich. State Univ. Press 1997).
19. IB's use of the word "goal" is very similar to the "positions" stated in positional bargaining. The
difference is that in IB, a goal is determined only by examining the underlying interests supporting that
goal. In positional bargaining a position is stated without determining if that position supports the
parties' interests or not. In some situations parties' positions can actually be counter-productive to their
overarching interests.
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Conversely, LB requires that parties invest more effort, time, and research in de-
veloping the issues for negotiation.2'
In determining what interests underlie their goals, the parties should begin by
recognizing that there are some interests they both share. Through joint brains-
torming sessions, they can create mutually beneficial solutions.22
B. Difficulties in Unearthing Common Interests in Collective Bargaining
Negotiations
Though each collective bargaining unit will have its own interests unique to
the organization and industry, there are some consistent interests represented
throughout collective bargaining in general. Typically, management's concern is
with the business as an institution, including the organizational health of the busi-
ness, teamwork, morale, and profit.23 Management is also known to advocate for
wage and benefit reductions and work-rule flexibility. 24 Conversely, the union's
interests include expanding union membership and strengthening the union as a
whole.25 Additionally, unions frequently request wage increases and an expansion
of employment benefits.26 While some of these interests are obviously opposed to
one another (i.e., wage increases versus wage concessions), IB can uncover how
each party's interests may actually be met by working together to achieve a mu-
tually agreeable solution. Though several of these interests are economic in na-
ture (i.e., wage increases), needs can focus on legal, psychological, and moral
aspects as well.27
Collective bargaining seeks to represent several different constituents at
once-all union members and all of management as a whole, for exam-
ple-4herefore, interests in labor-management negotiations "can involve a wide
spectrum of issues, including wages, hours, job security, safety, health, employee
benefits and work design."28 Issues such as safety and health are particularly inte-
grative or interested-based in nature, and they can be explored in great depth in
the negotiation process.29
There can also be several different constituencies within the labor union
alone. For example, one union may be comprised of older workers with needs and
interests focused on their impending retirement, like increased pensions, while the
same union may also contain younger workers who are much more interested in
21. After a joint brainstorming session consensus building can help the parties consolidate and agree
on the issues presented before moving on to determining appropriate solutions. Id. at 43. See Section
V, infra, for a discussion of this process.
22. Id.
23. HARBISON & COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 8.
24. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., Collective Bargaining in the Twenty-First Century: A Negotia-
tions Institution at Risk, 23 NEGOTIATION J. 249, 255 (2007).
25. HARBISON & COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 13.
26. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., supra note 24, at 255.
27. Hurder, supra note 7, at 268-69. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of
Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L REV. 754, 794-801 (1984).
28. Leib Leventhal, Implementing Interest-Based Negotiation: Conditions for Success with Evidence
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access to immediate income. 30 This problem with representing multiple consti-
tuencies is compounded when actors from the national union step in since the
national office may have an entirely different set of goals and interests than local
union leadership.
31
There are similar issues with multiple interests on the management side. For
instance, corporate officials may have different interests than local management
representatives. 32 Even within the local company, production managers may have
a different outlook and approach than human resource managers. 33 In any organi-
zation and at any bargaining table, "the concern of both labor leaders and compa-
ny executives over their own ,ersonal goals and ambitions may lead to a bitter
struggle for personal prestige.
IB represents a change from positional bargaining to bargaining focused on
interests; therefore,"[m]anagement needs to be careful not to include with their
suggested issues their preferred answer, e.g., not to take a position on exactly how
to settle the issue." 35 For example, asserting thatthe collective bargaining agree-
ment needs to provide a clause allowing management to limit the number of su-
pervisory positions does not state an issue, but instead indicates the preferred an-
swer. To determine what issues or interests underlie this answer, the management
representatives advocating this goal should ask themselves why they feel this
clause is needed. That answer is likely the interest underlying the goal. In this
example, the interest supporting this goal could be a concern about allocation of
duties, a need to alter the local plant organization to fit with a corporate reorgani-
zation, or a concern with costs and benefits associated with higher supervisory
pay. IB focuses on interests, not positions, so taking a position on the opposing
side's interests is, in essence, reverting back to the traditional system of bargain-
ing. In the example provided, simply demanding the clause which allows man-
agement to limit supervisory positions, without explaining their interests in having
this provision, does nothing more than revert the negotiation back to the linear
model of positional bargaining. If instead, management explained the interests
underlying the clause, it is possible that both sides could collaborate and come up
with a clause that addresses the union's interests, while still meeting the underly-
ing management interests.
In ascertaining the opposition's interests, parties must remember to really lis-
ten to what the other side is saying, rather than operating on assumptions as to
what the opposing party would be interested in. For example, research has shown
that fear of job loss is actually not an interest for unions negotiating new collective
30. Hunt, Jr., supra note 2, at 272-73.
31. Id. at 273. "It is not unusual for workers to have higher expectations of gains to be had than their
negotiators' expectations, leading to strife during the negotiations if workers are asked to approve what
they consider to be an offer inferior to their expectations." Id.
32. Id. Multi-employer bargaining units also present their own set of difficulties.
[D]ifferent employers can have different goals in a multi-employer bargaining unit, and these dif-
ferent views within each camp may result in a lack of authority in the actual negotiators, or at the
least, confused signals which impair their ability to actually make decisions without constantly
checking back with their constituents.
Id.
33. Id.
34. HARBISON & COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 17.
35. Barrett, supra note 20, at 43.
No. 1]
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bargaining agreements, though such an interest is often assumed. 36  Similarly,
both sides must recognize "that in developing a list of issues, they are dealing with
constituents' expectations, and they should not distort them," by straying too far
from their constituents' wishes.
37
IV. THE HISTORiCAL DEVELOPMENT OF LB
In uncovering the parties' interests and developing those interests toward a
mutual solution, the goal of 1B is to treat the dispute as a mutual problem to be
resolved by the parties.38 1B can be a useful tool in formulating collective bar-
gaining agreements that address the interests of both parties (management and
union) while fostering positive relationships built on trust and mutual interest for
future negotiations.
The history of IB, as a specific negotiating technique, can be traced back to
sociologist Mary Parker Follett.39 Parker Follett introduced 1B in the 1920s "as a
justification for promoting collective bargaining between management and la-
bor.' '4 Parker Follett showed that companies who needed workers and employees
who needed income could trade resources to create benefits for both.41 "The re-
sulting agreements had the additional advantages of securing industrial peace,
reducing conflict, and increasing the wealth of society." 42 Parker Follett's ideas
and research were later applied to new theories of negotiation, such as 1B43
LB is the product of the movement for collective bargaining in labor-
management relations.44 Collective bargaining in labor relations led to an expan-
sion of dispute-resolution procedures like negotiation, arbitration, and mediation.45
The ideas and support for non-adversarial approaches in labor-management rela-
tions that Follett advocated were eventually transformed into legislation in the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA"). 46 The NLRA, for the first time,
36. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Thomas Kochan, Taking Stock: Collective Bargaining at the Turn
of the Century, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 16 (2004). The authors predicted that this was because
of a tightening labor market and high unemployment rates during the study. Id.
37. Barrett, supra note 20, at 43.
38. Skratek, supra note 18, at 60.




43. Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills & Selves 33 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 503, 520-22 (2008). See, e.g., Richard E. Walton & Robert B. McKersie A BEHAVIORAL
THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM (McGraw Hill
1965); FISHER ET AL., supra note 12.
44. Hurder, supra note 7, at 278.
For many years, dispute-resolution professionals from the field of labor-management relations
reached out to their counterparts in other fields in search of a common agenda. They found allies
in the movement for court reform. The court reform movement that emerged in the 1970's
adopted Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as a solution to problems in the administration of
justice.
Id. at 279.
45. Id. at 280.
46. Id. The NLRA was amended in 1947; provisions were added that supported "voluntary media-
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legally required management and unions to bargain in "good faith" and imposed
penalties for refusing to do SO. 4 7 The NLRA also expanded alternative dispute
resolution by creating a federal system of dispute resolution procedures. 8
Though the NLRA supported alternative dispute resolution procedures, col-
lective bargaining units largely used adversarial negotiation tactics to develop
collective bargaining agreements. Still, the labor negotiation climate has changed,
as 1B is currently growing in popularity among collective bargaining units. A
recent survey of companies with collective bargaining agreements determined that
"a remarkably high percentage of union and management negotiators are familiar
with the process - between 65 percent and 80 percent of the respondents[, and a]
large and growing proportion of respondents report having used this approach at
some point in time.
'49
The concept of integrative negotiation is not entirely new to collective bar-
gaining. In 1951, union-management cooperation was described as "a relationship
in which the parties through joint action attempt to reduce unit costs of produc-
tion, increase efficiency, and improve the competitive position of the firm."
50
Though this cooperative relationship was rare at the time, it "usually develop[ed]
out of some kind of economic crisis and [was] limited to small companies which
bargain with small local unions.
' 51
Despite the fact that 1B is growing in popularity, the adversarial mindset is
still largely entrenched. The historical tension in labor-management relations,
combined with the parties' reliance on adversarial bargaining, has produced a
management-union relationship based on minimal trust.52 As one commentator
has stated, "[t]he foremost consideration [when approaching a labor-management
negotiation] is likely the historical antipathy of management to unions, as well as
the perception of union members that management will never treat them fairly,
nor compensate them reasonably, for their endeavors. ' 53 This distrust between the
parties can further entrench positional bargaining between the parties because
"[t]hese feelings frequently result in extreme bargaining positions with aggressive
and antagonist bargaining tactics when a party feels that he, she, or it needs to
exhibit strength at the negotiation table."
54
1B's ability to build trust and strengthen parties' relationships makes it an
ideal fit for collective bargaining because it provides an opportunity to overcome
47. Id.
48. Id. at 280 n. 120. This includes "mandatory bargaining enforced by the NLRB and federal courts,
voluntary mediation and conciliation, and provisions for submission of disputes to third party binding
arbitration." Id.
49. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., supra note 24, at 258.
However, [ulnion and management responses showed great disparity when respondents were
asked if they used this approach in their most recent negotiations. Nearly one-third of managers
reported using it, but only about half as many union negotiators did. This may reflect different
views of what constitutes interest-based bargaining; it may also reflect unilateral efforts to use
interest-based methods by managers without the concurrence of their union counterparts.
Id. at 258-59.
50. HARBISON & COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 89.
51. Id.
52. HARBISON & COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 9.
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these years of distrust and acrimonious dealings.5 5 Though suggesting IB to par-
ties with a mutual low-trust relationship may seem risky, its use can produce bet-
ter outcomes than the adversarial bargaining that reinforces the distrust that has
historically been present in labor-management negotiations. As such, labor and
management negotiators alike are concluding that the adversarial model does not
fit with the complex nature of collective bargaining.56 In contrast, an IB approach
may counteract this cyclical low-trust relationship by "foster[ing] a freedom from
fear that goes beyond that provided by law, contract, or economic rationality."
57
Furthermore, trust is critical to the future of collective bargaining. Though the
process has survived for decades, "[a] supposedly long-term relationship that is
not based on some foundation of trust, however hard earned, is not likely to en-
dure."
58
Some detractors may fear that LB's incorporation of problem-solving tech-
niques may expand the time companies and unions spend negotiating new con-
tracts, resulting in higher costs for both companies and unions. However, it may
assuage their fears to know that focusing on interests rather than positions actually
produces higher satisfaction with settlement outcomes, fosters better working
relationships, and can result in lower transaction costs.
59
V. IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING IN THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
A. Impediments to IB in the Collective Bargaining Process
Though IB may work well in the labor negotiation setting, as with any major
business change, its implementation does come with some difficulties. The first
of such impediments is combating the years of adversarial negotiating that have
been the main strategy in collective bargaining. This is such a challenge because
negotiators who are used to positional bargaining may feel as though they are
losing control over the negotiation by switching to IB, which necessarily requires
collaboration to be successful.6 °
The second of theses impediments is encompassed in the fear that switching
to IB may be more pronounced among union negotiators as research indicates that
IB may have more negative effects on unions than adversarial bargaining, produc-
55. But see Hunt, Jr., supra note 2, at 271, asserting that "it is difficult to apply interest-based bar-
gaining in labor-management negotiations because of constituency pressures and the lack of trust."
56. Fonstad et al., supra note 4, at 9.
57. Kirk Blackard, How to Make the Most of the Employment ADR Process, 54 Disp. RESOL. J. 71,
76 (May 1999): "Within the employment relationship [trust] is an unwritten, usually unspoken, con-
tract among parties who have influence over things that are important to each other, that allows each of
the parties to believe in the honesty, integrity, justice and reliability of the other." Id.
58. NELKEN, supra note 5, at 124-125. Management can increase trust within the relationship on a
day-to-day basis by demonstrating "its trustworthiness through its management process. These
processes must convince employees that management will deal with them honestly and with integrity,
seek justice for them as well as the company, and deliver on all its representations." Blackard, supra
note 57, at 76.
59. W.L. URY ET AL., GErrING DIsPUTES RESOLVED 14 (Jossey-Bass 1988). See id. at 10-15 for a
discussion on various costs associated with different approaches to resolving disputes.
60. Leventhal, supra note 28, at 53.
[Vol. 2009
8
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss1/8
Making Friends of Foes
ing more union concessions and fewer union gains. 61 It is possible this occurs
because management typically has a power advantage over unions in the collec-
tive bargaining process because there are generally more available workers than
open jobs. This power differential leads union negotiators to be particularly wary
of the IB process, which they could view as giving management even more power
and leverage. 62 This fear is compounded by the parties' tradition of adversarial
bargaining----"[a] negotiator used to positional bargaining is likely to react with
suspicion if the other negotiator suddenly switches to interest-based negotia-
tions. 63
A third difficulty in implementing IB is that distributive and integrative issues
are both present in labor-management negotiations, and it can be difficult to effec-
tively use adversarial and integrative techniques at the same time.64 Other com-
mentators have theorized that one of the reasons IB has not worked in the collec-
tive bargaining context is that a respectful and good working relationship between
the negotiating parties is necessary to ensure its success. Unfortunately, this
foundation is lacking in many companies,65 as demonstrated by their low-trust
relationship. Without this basis of trust between the parties, they are less likely to
try TB; and those who do are less likely to see positive results because the low-
trust relationship can result in a lack of cooperation at the bargaining table.
B. How to Overcome These Impediments by Implementing IB into the
Collective Bargaining Process
To combat many of these fears and risks, parties should recognize that IB is a
major change to their approach to negotiations. As such, they should be prepared
to learn about the process prior to bargaining with the style. To ensure IB's suc-
cess in the collective bargaining context, both parties should research IB and seek
out training in the IB concepts. 66 Training and simulated negotiations in IB can
help combat the initial feeling of vulnerability that might result from the switch to
a new and unfamiliar method of bargaining. Education about the process is also
essential because negotiators unfamiliar with IB will likely be confused about the
difference between interests and positions-a central component which lays the
foundation for a successful negotiation.
67
61. Reaud Paquet et al., Does Interest-Based Bargaining (IBB) Really Make a Difference in Collec-
tive Bargaining Outcomes?, 16 NEGOTIATION J. 281, 293 (2000). In this study, the authors focused on
LB in Canada. The authors compared 19 collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the LB ap-
proach and the 19 collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the traditional approach. Id. at 281.
62. Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, supra note 36, at 260.
In labor management relationships the question of who is more powerful is determined by who is
less dependent on the other. If the employer needs the employees' work more than the employees
need the employer's pay, then the company is more dependent and therefore less powerful. Con-
versely, if the employees need the pay, then the employees are more dependent and less power-
ful.
Skratek, supra note 18, at 59.
63. Leventhal, supra note 28, at 53.
64. Hunt, Jr., supra note 2, at 270-7 1.
65. Leventhal, supra note 28, at 54-55.
66. Id. at 55.
67. Id. at 53.
No. 11
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Once parties are educated on the topic, the IB approach is incredibly flexible
and can be tailored to each industry's needs. Generally, most IB styles progress
from open discussion to workable solutions. Prior to negotiating with the other
side, the parties should each work within their own organization to determine their
goals. After each side fully understands their individual interests, they should
participate in "wide-ranging discussion of the problems at hand" with the other
side.68 The goal with this discussion is not to generate possible solutions or an-
swers, but rather to simply analyze the issues before them. The more the parties
can honestly and openly discuss these problems and their interests, the more likely
they are to find solutions that meet their interests.
During this discussion, the parties should feel free to disclose the interests
they have uncovered during their individual sessions. Though there may be hesi-
tation about disclosure to a recognized adversary, disclosing one's interest can
actually be a sign of strength and confidence in one's interests, and the reasons for
seeking those interests.
69
After fully discussing the problem, the parties can jointly generate unantici-
pated, inventive solutions that address each party's interests. 70 For example, if the
union's interests concern providing a better work-life balance for their employees,
the union might simply demand that management increase the number of vacation
days allotted to every employee. Such a request, without more, is likely to result
in resistance from management. A creative solution to this interest, however,
could be instituting a "floating holiday" system, where employees could elect
which of a handful of non-traditional holidays they would like to have off from
work. Even if the parties do find a creative solution, they should continue brains-
torming before committing to any specific outcome.71
It is imperative that the parties understand that being open to discussion about
proposals is not the same as agreeing to those suggestions. Also, discussing the
opposing side's proposals can actually improve one's own ideas, thus resulting in
a better outcome.73
There will also be variations in how well the process works. Factors that may
influence the success of the IB negotiation include the parties' relationship, in-
cluding their collective bargaining history, and the amount of trust inherent in
their relationship. 74 In addition to training in IB, relationship-building discussions
and the parties' commitment to the negotiation style can all positively impact the
likelihood of success.75
68. NELKEN, supra note 5, at 123.
69. Id. at 122-23.




74. Leventhal, supra note 28, at 55. If parties can move past their initial reservations about the
process it can bring about long lasting rewards-a survey of labor negotiators found that after B was
implemented only twenty percent reported a negative experience of the process. Cutcher-Gershenfeld
& Kochan, supra note 36, at 15.
75. Leventhal, supra note 28, at 55.
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VI. EFFECTS OF INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING ON THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING PROCESS
A. IB in the Kaiser-Permanente Bargaining Agreements
Though IB is a new approach to labor-management negotiations, studies have
documented its use and effectiveness. 76 While multiple bargaining units have
tried IB in their negotiations, the renegotiation of the Kaiser-Permanente collec-
tive bargaining agreement is likely the largest and most well-documented use of
the approach. Kaiser-Permanent is the third largest integrated health organization
system in the United States.77 As of 2000, the company employed 130,000 indi-
viduals, 80,000 of whom were unionized.78
Prior to the current national agreement, Kaiser and a coalition of unions
adopted a partnership agreement in 1997 that provided the foundation for imple-
mentation of LB in collective bargaining in the 2000 national agreement. 79 In
2000, the parties negotiated their first national agreement using 1B.80 That negoti-
ation involved eight national and international unions, as well as twenty-six local
unions, all of which bargained individually with Kaiser-Permanente, creating a
total of thirty-three separate agreements.8 1 By 2005, the negotiations included ten
unions representing forty-four bargaining units and 86,000 union members.
82
Management during the 2005 negotiation was separated into two groups: the
Kaiser Health Plan and Hospitals and the Permanente Medical Groups.
8 3
Using IB during the bargaining process in both 2000 and 2005 reinforced the
importance of trust in negotiations. Researchers found that a high level of trust
enabled and supported the use of IB in Kaiser-Permanente's negotiations.' In-
itially, the parties had to overcome the low-trust relationship resultant from years
of adversarial bargaining. Once trust was established throughout the negotiations,
the parties were able to incorporate the tactics and processes encompassing LB.85
The 2005 negotiation addressed six overarching issues: (1) accountability; (2)
the need for an adequate number of employees to carry out every day work; (3) a
need to develop skills to carry out the organization's goals; (4) diffusion of leader-
ship ideas from the top down to lower-level employees; (5) a desire to focus on
the operational task of delivering health care; and (6) a need to develop a means of
76. See, e.g., Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, supra note 36; Reaud Paquet et al., supra note 61;
Fonstad et al., supra note 4.
77. Leventhal, supra note 28, at 55.
78. Id.
79. Id. The 2000 agreement was the parties' first national agreement. Robert B. McKersie et al.,
Bargaining Theory Meets Interest Based Negotiations: A Case Study, 47 INDUS. REL. 66, 70 (2008).
80. McKersie et al., supra note 79, at 70.
81. Leventhal, supra note 28, at 55. Contra Harbison & Coleman, supra note 6 (asserting coopera-
tive approaches in 1951 were limited to small unions and small companies).
82. McKersie et al., supra note 79, at 68.
83. Id. McKersie's study focused on the 2005 national contract negotiations between Kaiser Perma-
nente and the Coalition of Kaiser Permanente Unions. Id. at 69. The Kaiser Health Plan and Hospitals
is the non-profit branch of the corporation: they provide insurance and hospital services. Id. The Per-
manente Medical Groups is a for-profit entity that works with clinics and medical providers. Id.
84. Id. at 66.
85. Id. at 66-67.
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measuring achievement. While the labor and management groups did not neces-
sarily view each of these issues as having the same amount of importance, there
were some issues both groups agreed should be addressed and resolved. For ex-
ample, while there was great divergence in the groups' views on wage disparities
between the eight regions that compose the company (sixteen percent of manage-
ment viewed it as a priority for the negotiation; eighty-six percent of labor nego-
tiators viewed it as a high priority), both groups agreed that building trust was an
important goal (ninety percent of union respondents and eighty-nine percent of
management negotiators).87
The Kaiser-Permanente process was broken down into two distinct phases.88
The first phase involved breaking down the negotiators into eight Bargaining Task
Groups ("BTGs"). 89 Each BTG met and negotiated a set of written recommenda-
tions that would be used to begin the next phase of bargaining. 90 Each BTG was
comprised of both management and labor representatives. 91 Post-negotiation sur-
veys revealed that members of the BTGs viewed their negotiations as predomi-
nantly interest-based on most issues, especially those related to employee atten-
dance and service quality. 92 Only the BTGs' discussions of benefits were signifi-
cantly influenced by traditional negotiating styles.
93
In phase two of the negotiations, a Common Interest Committee ("CIC"),
made up of forty union and management representatives, met and used recom-
mendations presented by leaders of the BTGs to negotiate the new collective bar-
gaining agreements. 94 While the Kaiser-Permanente bargaining process demon-
strated that IB has potential to work in large-scale negotiations, it also illustrated
how-when all issues could not be resolved through IB--the parties could suc-
cessfully merge the traditional adversarial negotiating approach with IB and pro-
duce a favorable outcome. The overall result was that 1B strategies "were used
extensively and successfully to reach mutually satisfying agreements when the
parties shared interests. When interests were in greater conflict, the parties re-
sorted to more traditional, positional tactics to reach resolution." 95 This combo
IB-traditional bargaining approach is referred to as a "mixed" approach. 96
Some commentators note that falling back into the traditional adversarial ap-
proach may have been an effective tactic in the Kaiser-Permanente negotiations.
This research determined that adversarial bargaining and positional tactics worked
best when the parties were most in conflict about the basic issues underlying their
goals. 97 Switching from IB to an adversarial method may have been effective
86. Id. at 71 Fig. 1.
87. Id. at 72 T.1.
88. Id. at 73.
89. Id.
90. Id. The BTGs met fifteen times over four months. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 74 T.2.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 78.
95. Id. at 66.
96. "[Flew scholars would presume that many negotiations are wholly integrative. Rather, most
negotiations are 'mixed motive;' they include both opportunities for joint gain, and opportunities for
grabbing more from the other side." Raymond A. Friedman & Debra L. Shapiro, Deception and Mu-
tual Gains Bargaining: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 243 (2007).
97. McKersie et al., supra note 79, at 94.
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because parties were faced with a need to resolve the disagreement before the
bargaining period ended. Adversarial bargaining is what the parties were most
accustomed to, so this method may have been faster and easier to implement when
the negotiators were pressed for time. Also, the parties may have switched to
adversarial bargaining in an effort to resolve their most entrenched, and most dif-
ficult to resolve, positions.
98
Ultimately, researchers concluded that IB was most effective when used to
address issues on which the parties shared mutual interests.99 For example, re-
searchers discovered that the parties shared the most agreement on the issue of
"backfill"--ensuring that there was a sufficient number of replacement employees
ready to step in when other workers took time off from work. l °° Here, both par-
ties agreed that resources should be devoted to this issue, the only question was
how those resources should be allocated and which solutions should be used to
address the backfill concern.' 0 ' The parties then used problem-solving techniques
to formulate a response that satisfied both management and labor. 1 2 In a sense,
the parties to the Kaiser-Permanente negotiation merely applied IB concepts to the
negotiations, rather than completely reworking their method of bargaining.1 3 The
negotiators incorporated IB tools such as joint research and information-sharing in
the BTGs, and brainstorming during the CIC negotiations. 104 Through these col-
laborative sessions, they were able to develop more options and consensus-based
solutions.10 5 As Kaiser-Permanente demonstrates, when IB is implemented in the
proper manner, it can produce positive changes-including increases in mutual
gains and more innovations in collective bargaining agreements.
106
B. Other IB Case Studies
Research has demonstrated that IB has helped parties find more creative solu-
tions in collective bargaining agreements. From 1999 to 2004, the implementa-
tion of IB resulted in contractual changes such as increased worker input, more
job security for workers, different pay systems, work-rule flexibility, and the crea-
tion of joint management-labor committees to handle various concerns with the






103. Id. at 94.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Paquet et al., supra note 61, at 293.
107. Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, supra note 36, at 15. Authors used data from the Federal Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS") National Performance Review Customer Survey to compare
randomly collective bargaining agreements produced in 1999 and again in 2004. The FMCS was
"created in 1947, [and] is an independent agency whose mission is to preserve and promote labor-
management peace and cooperation." FMCS, Who We Are, available at
http://www.fmcs.gov/internetcategoryList.aspcategoryD=13 (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
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torming and task forces with management were less likely to report reductions in
benefits and were, in fact, more likely to report benefit increases.1
08
Once implemented, 1B can remain effective for parties after initial use: two-
thirds of managers and nearly forty percent of union representatives stated that
they continued to use IB processes after their initial foray into the approach. 109
VII. CONCLUSION
The Kaiser-Permanente studies demonstrate that not only can IB work, but it
can work with a very large company that must address the interests of several
thousand people. The Kaiser-Permanente example also demonstrates that al-
though IB can make some headway into altering the parties' adherence to adver-
sarial bargaining, "a mixed process that [draws] on the best features of both con-
ventional positional and newer [IB] approaches to negotiations"'1 0 may be a more
realistic approach for initial implementation of IB in collective bargaining.
Although research has shown there was some decline from 1999 to 2004 in
the number of labor negotiators, particularly union negotiators, who describe IB as
"good, very good, or excellent,"' t labor organizations and companies who have
attempted 1B are trying it again, rather than abandoning their efforts. Not coinci-
dentally, perhaps, the decline in use of IB also indicated an increase in "adversari-
al relationships, greater divergence in the views of labor and management, a de-
cline in workplace innovation, and a decline in preference for interest-based bar-
gaining."
' ' 2
When implementing IB, it is important to remember that each labor-
management relationship is different, each made up of different people with dif-
ferent viewpoints. Each person brings his or her own approach to the bargaining
process, which can explain the variance in collective bargaining relationships.11 3
IB can be a good fit for the collective bargaining context, but that does not mean
that it would be effective for every relationship. Parties with a good history of
bargaining, mutual leverage, and a positive working relationship may benefit
greatly from IB. However, where the relative power of each side is skewed, IB
risks exaggerating the balance of power and resulting in greater concessions from
one side rather than the other. Because of this, parties should examine their col-
lective bargaining history and relative leverage to determine if TB is a proper fit.
108. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., supra note 24, at 260. "[W]hile the counterpart managers also re-
ported benefit increases, they did report some benefit reductions taking place." Id. The authors pro-
posed three reasons for the different results: "(1) the parties ... found different and mutually satisfac-
tory ways to frame the same agreement...; (2) the union negotiators who took the risk of using inter-
est-based bargaining were disposed.., to view whatever outcome they reached as favorable; or (3) the
two sides are headed for difficulties when they implement the contract." Id. at 260-61.
109. Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, supra note 36, at 15.
110. McKersie et al., supra note 79, at 95.
111. Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, supra note 36, at 14. This result is not that alarming, as "[tihere
was also some fall-off in managers' rating of the value of traditional approaches." Id. Given that man-
agers are rating traditional approaches less favorably may be a good opportunity to persuade them to
use IB as an alternative to the traditional adversarial process.
112. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., supra note 24, at 253.
113. HARBISON& COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 18-19.
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Parties should also remain realistic about 1B. Using IB does not necessarily
ensure positive results, but it is one method that parties can employ to increase
their chances of negotiating for terms that best benefit their interests. In sum, IB
is an important tool in collective bargaining negotiations; however, it is not being
used to its full potential now." 4 To build on IB's role in collective bargaining in
the future, education about the process, as well as dissemination of information
about successful IB negotiations (such as Kaiser-Permanente's), are essential to
demonstrating that IB is a viable method of negotiation for some collective bar-
gaining units.
CARLY DUVALL
114. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., supra note 24, at 259.
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